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Imagining a ‘Secular’ India: Roots, Offshoots 




1. Two ‘Moments’ of Rupture ‒ National Blemishes and the Lapse 
of Secularism
1.1.  Ayodhya in 1992 
“Ram lala hum jayenge, mandir wahi banayenge.”1(We shall march to 
the Ram Janmabhoomi [the birth place of Lord Ram in Ayodhya] and 
build a temple there.)
In 1992, Ayodhya, a city in the North Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, 
clenched in communal horror as Hindu fundamentalists, proclaiming to 
be disciples of Ram ‒ one of Hinduism’s most prominent deities, marched 
in large numbers towards it, chanting the above slogan, with the aim to 
build a temple (mandir) and simultaneously destroy a mosque (masjid). 
This was India’s very own critical rupture ‒ one that would push it into 
a nation-wide uproar of religious controversy and riots not just in the 
coming months but for many years to follow, severely wounding the care-
fully fabricated ideal of Indian secularism (Morey and Tickell 2005: ix).
What could be so tumultuous, one may ask, about constructing a 
temple in a city which was not very famous for its commerce, economic 
standing and political significance, “a place with no resonances of colo-
nial humiliation or trace of futuristic monuments, but a stage where a 
quite different historical drama would be re-enacted”? (Khilnani 1997: 
152) The controversy behind Ayodhya lay not just in the city’s local 
past but in what role it had mythologically come to occupy for India’s 
Hindus and Muslims alike. Since the 16th century, there stood in Ayod-
hya a mosque, the Babri Masjid, which had been built by the emperor 
Babur, founder of the Mogul dynasty in India. Debates have it that this 
was done on the remnants of a destroyed Hindu mandir. The bone of 
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contention was thus not that, now, centuries later, a mandir would be 
built again in Ayodhya where it historically stood, but that it would be 
erected at the very same spot where the masjid was, where Ram was 
born. The trigger, to a religious conflict that eventually came to shatter 
India’s secular image, was thus not that the mandir would be built but 
that it would be constructed on the debris of a destroyed Babri Masjid 
(Van der Veer 1994).
In order to instrumentalise the construction, bricks were collected 
(with the name of the God inscribed on them) from not just all over 
India but also from Hindu Diaspora located in the United Kingdom, the 
United States, South Africa, the Caribbean and Canada (Khilnani 1997: 
150).2 The demolition did indeed materialise as, on 6th of December, 
1992, thousands marched to the masjid led by the Hindu right wing 
combine of India’s very prominent political party, the BJP (Bharatiya 
Janata Party)3 and an international Hindu organisation, the VHP (Vishwa 
Hindu Parishad).4 The masjid was “reduced to a pile of rubble” (Morey 
and Tickell 2005: ix) with the usage of shovels and axes. Communal 
riots followed the event in Ayodhya and eventually in many other parts 
of India. The closing chapter in the existence of the masjid had opened 
a new one in Indian politics.
1.2.  The Godhra Carnage, 2002
On the 27th of February, 2002, 10 years post the Ayodhya incident, a 
train coach of the Sabarmati Express, carrying Hindu pilgrims returning 
from Ayodhya, was set to fire, allegedly by a Muslim ‘mob’, in Godhra 
(Gujarat) killing 59 pilgrims, mostly women and children.5 The incident 
led once again to a communal uproar all over the state of Gujarat as 
violence in immeasurable proportions overtook the state. 
Some of the most severe riots in the state broke out in the cities of 
Ahmedabad, Vadodra and Porbandar, percolating to numerous villages 
along the central and north-eastern belt in the state. Hindu agitators 
attacked Muslims in the state in retaliation to the train burning leading 
to a death of approximately 2000 people,6 whereas thousands were 
displaced. The demons that the Ayodhya incident had produced were 
invoked yet again and it seemed that India had been brutally awakened 
another time from the slumber of communal peace.7
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2. Colonial Trysts, Nationalism, ‘Religion’ and the Secular
Both the above described chains of events formulate the point of de-
parture for this chapter. Whereas the events of 1992 are seen as the 
trigger that started the communal wave with a ferocious vigour, those 
of 2002 are seen as a continuity to the same. It is in this context, that 
the attack on the secular identity of India came to be challenged both 
nationally and internationally, triggering a response of attempts to re-
construct the image of Indian secularism by its political elite. It is post 
these two events that the themes of communalism and secularism came 
to be even more rigorously debated and “kept alive” in contemporary 
India (Tejani 2008: 3).
For any comprehensive narrative of whether the paradigm is a more 
recent invention that has brutally come to ‘infect’ Indian politics and 
the national agenda, or if it indeed has a long trajectory in the sub-
continental history, one cannot avoid diving into the realms of the colo-
nial legacy and post-colonial developments of the Indian Nation state. 
Here the term ‘post’ is not used simply as an available replacement for 
‘after’ but intends to focus on the continuum, the red-string, that has 
trickled down from the colonial encounter and acquires visibility in the 
developments that occurred in India as a sovereign state. This permea-
tion has determined, to a great extent, the roadways treaded by India’s 
politics. Thus, no discussion on Indian modernity or Indian secularism 
can be complete when devoid of the colonial encounter and its impact 
on post-colonial India. 
Partha Chatterjee (1993: 94) states that “[t]he materials of Hindu 
nationalist rhetoric current in post-colonial India were fashioned from 
the very birth of nationalist historiography.” The aim here is thus to 
delve into seeking an understanding of the rise of the Hindu Right Wing, 
and its claims for a Hindu Nation, by not just focusing on the events of 
the 1980s and the following decades, but by providing a larger histori-
cal environment that also encompasses the colonial era and the Indian 
national movement for independence. It is through this lens that the 
historical context to the career that the terms secularism and commu-
nalism have in contemporary India, will be grasped. However, before 
delving into the ‘Indian’ understandings, another aspect demands con-
sideration. Here the lens ought to be shifted from the colonial subject 
staging the struggle for political independence to the colonising power 
itself ‒ the Empire. An important question to be posed is was the British 
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imperial policy secular? Nandini Chatterjee (2011: 8) states that “the 
imperial term of choice was ‘neutrality’ towards all religions, a term 
whose sheer insipidity and indication of vacuum may have prevented 
historians from paying close attention to British imperial religious pol-
icy.” This principle of neutrality was established via Queen Victoria’s 
Proclamation of 1858 (Mondal 2005: 6). 
With regard to the Proclamation and the weight it gave to the idea 
of neutrality, John Zavos (2000: 36), points out that “[t]he reason for 
the prominence of religion can be explained through British pre-occu-
pations in the wake of the 1857 Rebellion, and through the underlying 
assumption that religion, degenerate though it may be, was the motor 
force of Indian civilisation and social relations.” However, to claim that 
this neutrality and equidistance, in some sense implied a ‘secular’ ap-
proach would be a statement that would be thoroughly misplaced both 
from the perspective of the liberal framework within which secularism 
as a formula had developed in the West as also in terms of how it was 
materialised and staged in colonial India. 
Peter Robb (2002: 300) aptly points out that:
After all […] secular values were quite weakly advanced both by 
the colonial state and in independent India. In practice the state 
offered religious neutrality and mutual toleration. The British, for 
all the heated rhetoric of some missionaries, soldiers and officials, 
mostly took great care to avoid attacking religious sentiment. 
Often they gave succour to religion, respecting Brahman dietary 
arrangements, or giving semi-clandestine support to mosques 
and temples, or promoting the political identities and interests of 
castes and religions. 
While on the one hand this “succour to religion” prevented innocent 
neutrality, the infamous ‘Divide and Rule’ policy points to its more ac-
tive annulment via enactment of religious differences during the colonial 
era. Though not the sole reason behind the Hindu-Muslim cleavages 
in colonial India, the policy, did exacerbate the pre-existing rifts. In 
1909, the introduction of the Minto-Morley Reforms (also called the In-
dia Councils Act) which was the first landmark effort to introduce more 
powers for Indian participation in governance of the country through 
legislative affairs, also announced the simultaneous provision of sepa-
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rate electorates for Muslims. These eventually were developed upon in 
future reformist acts (Montague Chelmsford Reforms of 1919 and finally 
the Communal Awards of 1932 which provided separate electorates for 
Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Dalits or lower castes). 
The above mentioned narrative is just a starting point to the reflec-
tions on the loaded trajectory of the ‘ideal’ of secularism in post-colonial 
India. Another important addition comes from the lens of the Indian 
national movement for independence as well. The Indian National Con-
gress, founded in 1885, could be viewed essentially as a product of a 
leadership that was largely inspired by British liberalism and for quite 
some time maintained a view (against the nationalist revolutionaries) 
of imposing trust in the Empire and seeking constitutional reforms from 
within its framework (Kulke and Rothermund 1998: 260). Even though, 
rifts existed between the Congress Extremists and the Moderates, the 
eventual route that would be treaded by the Congress would be more or 
less united in its perspectives on what the ‘future’ state would look like.8 
As will be highlighted later, this imagination was largely guided by Neh-
ru’s conception of secularism, primarily post 1940. Ayesha Jalal (1995: 
39), in her account of the different trajectories of the Indian National 
Congress and the All India Muslim League (the second most important 
political party formulated in 1906) and later those of ‘democratic’ India 
and ‘authoritarian’ Pakistan, clarifies that “[a]s the most likely inheritor 
of the British colonial mantle, Congress’s secularism derived from prag-
matic as much as moral and ethical considerations. Congress’s claim 
to be the only representative organisation in a society divided along 
community and caste lines demanded the conspicuous projection of a 
secular ideology.”
The imperative question then to be asked is what about the under-
standings of secularism within the framework of the Indian National 
Congress during the phase of 1885 (its inception) to 1947 (India’s in-
dependence)? Was there a consistency in the claim to secularism that 
may be traced in the Congress’s own evolution as a political party? On 
the one side, the understanding that a sensitive approach had to be 
adopted considering the religious diversity of the country in staging 
a mass-mobilised struggle for independence for no singular religious 
identity’s association with the movement could help it give a truly na-
tional character, prompted a thrust towards the ideal of secularism. On 
the other side however, there was also a different understanding that 
seemed to be brewing. Morey and Tickell (2005: xvi) state that:
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[…] The Congress Party that led India to independence has strong 
practical as well as ideological reasons for endorsing inter-com-
munal tolerance rather than a strongly secularist line. In order to 
increase national solidarity and reinforce a sense of a common 
anti-colonial grievance, the Congress –itself a very diverse body 
– had maintained a strategy of absorbing the different religious 
communities into the Indian polity rather than demanding a uni-
form, secular adherence to the concept of the nation.What one 
finds thus is a Janus-faced paradoxical translation of a secular 
ideology into a lop-sided secular politics. 
In one of the typical paradoxes of Indian society the very factors neces-
sitating the politics of secular nationalism laid the basis for particular-
istic religious communalism. Despite the official creed of secularism, 
a succession of Congress leaders both before and after Gandhi had 
grasped the expediency of resorting to popular Hindu religious symbols. 
(Jalal 1995: 25)
What adds another twist to the story of the term in the sub-continent 
is the enormous gap that appeared between the politics of rhetoric and 
reality. The dream of a secular ideology of the Indian National Congress 
could never find basis in being translated into ‘secular politics.’ From 
late 19th century onwards, many voices within the Congress leadership 
employed Hindu religious symbolism as a strategy for mass-mobilisa-
tion (Jalal 1995: 26). The necessity for cultural confidence vis-à-vis the 
colonial power, provoked the utilisation of the readily available tool kit 
of Hindu religious customs, practices, prayers, symbols and rituals by its 
majority Hindu leadership to generate solidarity and mobilise the Indian 
population. It is here that the role of media in the generation of aes-
thetic formations (Meyer et. al 2002)9 came to play an enormous role in 
Indian national movement. The leaders, in fact, capitalised upon their 
available cultural resources to translate the movement into a numerical 
strength. For example practices like Ganapati Pooja (worship of Hindu 
deity Ganesh) or Ganesh Chaturthi were popularised by leaders like Bal 
Gangadhar Tilak (1893) to replace the Muslim festival of Moharram in 
Maharashtra (Morey and Tickell 2005: 14). 
The following is another example of the many available from the 
speeches of a very famous nationalist visionary Bipin Chandra Pal 
(1906: 10-11), who wrote on the anniversary of the Partition of Bengal: 
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“In thy waters, Holy Mother, are mixed the two streams of Aryan and 
Semitic culture [...] both the Hindus and the Mahomedans have a com-
mon inheritance in art and civilisation [...] resonant with the minstrelsy 
of two great world-cultures.” Though on a cursory glance, this may in-
deed appeal as a classic example of a construction of a Hindu-Muslim 
composite syncretic identity, appealing to the combined forces in the 
national movement, it is interesting to note the ‘unspoken’ elements. 
Here the Aryan culture is equated as the ‘original’ Indian one (essen-
tially Hindu) whereas Islam is equated with a Semitic culture, indicating 
that it was indeed an ‘Other’, that bore an affiliation to the Middle East 
rather than ‘belonging’ to the Indian sub-continent. Due to paucity of 
space, this section will not engage with this subject in depth. 
However, such hints as visible in the material analysed for this work 
indicate how many leaders belonging to the Congress, in attempts to 
unite and mobilise a vast Hindu majority which was divided along caste 
lines, employed the medium of festivals as also their writing to revoke 
a sense of community. However, this paradoxically led to the further 
estrangement of the Muslims. The very name given to India, Bharatvar-
sha, in fact echoes strongly of the borders that were ideologically being 
drawn in a colonial India with respect to questions of roots and belong-
ing (Jalal 1995: 26). Constant references made to the term were not a 
naive engagement of the nationalist leaders, but rather a statement, as-
sociating the country with its first Hindu king, Bharat, after which it was 
named and from whose story, the epics unfold. Jalal (1995: 26) states 
that “[a] definition of the Indian nation fashioned on ideas of territorial-
ity found in ancient Hindu texts and popular mythology was not seen to 
compromise Congress’ secularism.”
Thus the ‘official creed’ of secularism was paralleled with a medium 
that employed excessive Hindu symbolism. This fed to the growing in-
security among the Muslim sect of the movement’s leadership that an 
independent India would find no adequate place for its Muslims. The si-
multaneous emergence of the All India Muslim League, that would later 
advance the claim for a separate nation for the Muslims, helped feed 
into the construction of a dichotomous narrativisation of the movement 
itself, whereby all associated with the Muslim League implied a politics 
of communalism whereas that associated with the Congress was secular 
nationalism. This narrative has no doubt been challenged by numer-
ous academics like Jalal (1995: 26) who rightfully point out that these 
‘labels’ weren’t absolute ‒ there were many more pro-Muslim political 
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leaders who abstained from the activities of the League because they 
saw it as an elite club that did not adequately represent the different 
sects of Islam in British India, while many self-proclaimed ‘secularists’ 
within the Congress resorted to a politics of religious distinction and 
symbolism. What is important historically from the perspective of the 
Indian nation state’s self-imagination as a secular democracy, is that 
later these official ideological narratives would be enmeshed in ‘nation-
al’ rhetoric so that the Muslim League’s agenda of establishing a Muslim 
state would translate into Pakistani national rhetoric and the Congress’s 
secular claim would translate into secular nationalism in the Indian con-
text (Chatterjee 2011). 
3. The Nehruvian Consensus and Gandhi’s Imaginations of a 
Secular India
After independence in 1947, the newly founded sovereign state pro-
claimed itself to be a ‘secular’ democracy. The underlying principle was 
that the state would not associate itself “with any particular faith but 
would give freedom to all religious functions”, as Nehru proclaimed al-
ready in 1945. The Nehruvian conception of secularism did not imply an 
utter rejection of the transcendental values of religions. The approach 
reflected the dictum Sarva Dharma Sambhav (literally meaning: all re-
ligions are true and equal). From this phraseology emerges the much 
debated Indian dictum that: 
The idea does not mean […] that society should be irreligious; on 
the contrary, there is acceptance that all religions are meaningful 
and that they should have a valid place in the life of the nation. 
However, religion is not a component in defining nationality or 
citizenship. The state should be neutral as between the country’s 
many religions and tolerant of all (Tambiah 2005: 422).
However, how the dictum has lent the contours between the state and 
the religious sphere even fuzzier shall be discussed in a later section of 
the paper. The President of the Union of India, re-echoed this consensus 
when he stated the following: 
When India is said to be a secular state, it does not mean we re-
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ject the reality of an unseen spirit or the relevance of religion to 
life or that we exalt – irreligion. It does not mean that secularism 
itself becomes a positive religion or that the State assumes divine 
prerogatives. Though faith in the Supreme is the basic principle 
of the Indian tradition, the Indian state will not identify itself with 
or be controlled by any particular religion. We hold that no one 
religion should be accorded special privileges in national life or 
international relations […]. No person should suffer any form of 
disability or discrimination because of his religion but all alike 
should be free to share to the fullest degree in the common life. 
This is the basic principle involved in the separation of Church and 
State. (Radhakrishnan 1955: 202)
Given the consideration to the plurality question in India, secularism 
was viewed as the surviving dictum that would unify all existing com-
munities under one umbrella, at least ideologically. With numerous ex-
isting religions, languages, lifestyles, the ideal was deemed as helpful 
in the actualisation and discursive construction of an ‘Indian nation-
ness.’ Another reason for the same was the horrors of the Partition 
of British India in 1947 into India and Pakistan. It was lucid that the 
communal violence, emanating in the Hindu Muslim riots, which accom-
panied the partition, could be avoided only if the existing minorities would 
be duly protected and not suppressed by a Hindu state. Gandhi’s Ram-
rajya, or the Kingdom of God on Earth (Gandhi 1929: 305),10 enthused 
with a deep sense of personal ‘religious’ understandings and Nehru’s 
conceptions of a secular India, stemming out of his personal agnostic 
reflections but an acquired understanding of the place of the transcen-
dental in the individual’s life in India, both could be viewed as attempts 
to ‘fixate’ the notion of the national-self above one coordinated by com-
munitarian or religious belongings. 
The project was one of producing and even materialising the notion 
of citizenship and placing it above that of individual faiths. Moreover, 
the claim was reinforced with a sovereign Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
being projected as the other. Contemporary Indian political rhetoric 
celebrates India’s diversity whereas secularism as a paradigm offers 
the terminological common ground, an approachable feasible formula, 
used thoroughly as a term, though its contents may imply different 
ideas for different actors, providing the space for that diversity to be 
celebrated. In fact, it is often projected that there is no other ideologi-
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cal common ground which could unite India. To cite one out of numer-
ous examples, the Indian Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao (1992), 
stated in response to the events of Ayodha that:
In a country of the size and diversity like ours, it is only the con-
cern and care for the sensibilities of each other which can ensure 
a smooth functioning of the institutions we have created. This is 
the only way to maintain peace and harmony amongst the people 
of India […]. The delicate fabric of our nation woven around de-
mocracy and secularism is the only anchor-sheet for our country’s 
existence.
What is remarkable for an understanding of the contemporary de-
bate on the paradigm of secularism in India is that, even during the 
Nehruvian period, the co-ordinates of the term were defined vis-à-
vis its prominent other, ‘Communalism’. This term has a very indig-
enous connotation in India, described as “conflict, often accompanied 
with violence, between religious communities, primarily the Hindus 
and the Muslims, for political and/or economic gains” (Vohra 1997: 
2). Thus enormous thrust was laid upon defining what secularism 
entailed for the Indians by defining what it ought not to be. Vohra 
(1997: 90), states that: 
The term communal has a unique meaning in India, and com-
munalism is a uniquely Indian development. Broadly speaking, 
communal groups are defined by their religion and not by their 
ethnicity, language, or region. An Indian newspaper, reporting 
a “communal riot” gives the religion of the parties involved and 
the location of the riot, but provides no details of the caste, 
language, or ethnic identity of the participants (unless that has 
a special significance). 
However, the term got institutionalised already in the twenties. As 
early as 1928 Nehru stated that “the real problem before [us] is how 
to exorcise communalism” (Akbar 1988: 217). During the following 
decades in a still colonial British India, the Congress agenda was 
permeated with ‘nationalism’ as the anti-thesis of the Raj-induced 
communalism but the term secularism itself remained primarily ab-
sent in the vocabulary. Post-independence and partition, the term 
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was used indeed as a replacement for nationalism but its contours 
were not thoroughly defined minus the rhetoric of the leadership, 
now in government, promoting ideals of tolerance, syncretism and 
pluralism as unifying ideals (Vohra 1997: 2).  Shabnum Tejani (2008) 
contests that secularism in India was not just a replacement, an ide-
ology or an off-shoot of nationalism, “it was nationalism itself”, always 
defined in respect to communalism “or the quest for Muslims to secure 
political recognition of their religious difference. When that frustrated 
quest led to a demand for partitioning of the nation, self-vindicated 
Indian Nationalism, always another name for Hindu majoritarianism, 
rebranded itself secularism, hence the emergence of that term in 
Indian political vocabulary in the 1940s” (Chatterjee 2011: 4-5). The 
primary discontent with the notion lay in the emphatic usurpation of 
the Congress in a post-colonial India of the idea itself ‒ there was a 
thrust on the ideal, however, its contours lay ambiguous, fuzzy and 
not concretely defined. 
The refusal of the Congress party, of Nehru in particular, to let 
secular policy emerge through negotiation between different 
communitarian voices provides a clue into the integral flaw in 
Nehruvian secularism, that is its Archimedean character […]. 
The usurpation by the Congress of the arena in which different 
communities could express their own voices, and its presump-
tion that it alone represents all these communities quashed 
any chances of an emergent secularism with greater moral le-
gitimacy and stability. (Bhargava 2006: 26)
The Constitution of the Union of India, which materialised its status 
as a republic, bore the brunt of these ambivalences. What became 
apparent is that the Indian potion of secularism would shift its lo-
cation on a wide spectrum of claims ‒ that religion was a defining 
factor of the Indian way of life, that Indian secularism did not imply 
irreligiousness, that religion had nonetheless to be relegated to the 
‘private’ realm and expelled from the realm of politics, that the state 
would grant equal freedom to one and all to practice, preach and pro-
fess their own belief systems but that this would not intermingle with 
the domains of the state, and paradoxically enough, that the state 
would have to intervene in the religious domain to protect minorities. 
Article 25 of the Constitution of India recognised the religious free-
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dom of all citizens of India. However, it nonetheless allowed the state 
to intervene in the same with the authority to regulate or restrict any 
economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with 
religious practices and allowing for legislative intervention for the 
sake of social welfare and justice “or the throwing open of the Hindu 
religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections 
of Hindus” (Bhargava 2006 23). There was a silence maintained also 
on “how to separate the secular from the religious matters” (Ibid.). 
This has obviously led to numerous controversies whereby it is prop-
agated by the Hindu right that the state intervenes primarily in the 
affairs of the Hindu majority whereas leaves the discriminatory prac-
tices of the minorities such as Muslims outside its purview (Ibid.). 
This aspect shall be further elaborated in the sections that follow on 
the recent debate and the actors involved with their distinct claims 
on secularism.
4. Post-Nehruvian era: The Visceral Side of the Construct ‒ 
Attacks and Ruptures 
The term ‘secular’ also has a distinct constitutional history to the Indian 
democracy. Added to the Preamble of the Indian Constitution only in 
1976 as per the 42nd Amendment, it was hailed as a distinct move to 
specify categorically that the only desirable form or version of democracy 
that India wished for was a ‘secular’ one. Paradoxically enough, this 
was introduced at a time when the country was in a state of internal 
Emergency, an initiative of the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. During this 
phase all civil liberties stood curtailed and the era is often viewed as a 
blemish in the trajectory of Indian democracy. 
Another controversial twist to the debate and its Indian story oc-
curred in 1985 in a court case filed by a Muslim woman named Shah 
Bano. Shah Bano, who was divorced by her husband, sued for the 
acquisition of maintenance which he refused to provide for. The Chief 
Justice of the Bench ruled, in accordance with the criminal procedures 
of the Indian Penal Code, that Muslims were also subject to mainte-
nance provisions. As per the ruling he was thus required to pay the 
decided maintenance. This ruling led to religious tumult among vari-
ous sections of the Muslim orthodoxy that viewed the Court’s ruling as 
a direct attack on the personal affairs of a community. A court of law 
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could not decide on norms that were pre-established as per private 
laws. The Muslim Personal Law Board made an appeal to the Parlia-
ment on behalf of Shah Bano’s husband. The then Prime Minister, Rajiv 
Gandhi, in the aftermath of having suffered remarkable Congress defeat 
in the by-elections in states like Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat, flexed 
the Parliament for the passing of a statute that reverted the ruling of 
the Court. This led to immense criticisms within the Hindu majority 
leadership that alleged the government of positing a pseudo-secularist 
stance. More critically, the case raised two profound issues that would 
continue bringing Indian secularism under a looming question mark.   
First, if a necessity was felt for the introduction of a Uniform Civil 
Code which would be applicable to all the citizens of India and take 
precedence over the personal laws of different religious communities 
in the country. It is important to state here that the various religious 
communities in India have their own versions of laws often called pri-
vate laws or religious codes that dictate the terms and behaviour of 
those born in these communities in matters especially relating to inher-
itance (property laws in general) and matrimony (Chaterjee: 2008). A 
Uniform Civil Code would eventually imply challenging such personal 
laws. Second, if there was to be a recognition, as such, of personal 
laws having a legitimate basis, what could be done if these personal 
laws became conflictual and contradictory to each other as also to 
Fundamental Rights as guaranteed under the Constitution? (Tambiah 
2005: 427-428). Unfortunately, much of the debate has not withdrawn 
from the terrains of these two provocations.
5. The Rise of the Hindu Right Wing
The rise of the Hindu Right Wing in India is not a recent occurrence 
that saw an emphatic thrust in its support in the eighties (this is traced 
below). Its roots and genesis can be traced to certain crucial develop-
ments in the writings of some prominent personalities as early as the 
twenties. One important writer in this direction is Vinayak D. Savarkar 
whose work Hindutva ‒ Who is a Hindu (1923), continues being an 
important text for the Hindu Right Wing. Morey and Tickell (2005: xiv) 
point out that: 
For Savarkar the only Indian community to fulfil the prescriptions 
ANANDITA BAJPAI
202
of ‘Hindutva’ or ‘condition of Hinduness’ was one that could claim 
‘Aryan racial descent, and could define India as both a ‘father-
land’ (pitrabhu) and a ‘holyland’ (punyabhu). Other communities 
such as Christians, Parsis and Muslims could not be admitted to 
Hindutva unless they reclaimed this meshed national-communal 
identity. Thus, […] Savarkar’s Hindus were called upon to see 
themselves as the chosen cultural custodians of Indian identity. 
In its present avatar, the Hindu Right Wing comprises largely of the 
RSS (Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh),11 which, to borrow Arundhati 
Roy’s phrase, is the “cultural guild” of the Hindu Right Wing, founded in 
1925. Its second important constituent body is the VHP (Vishwa Hindu 
Parishad), founded by the RSS in 1964. The VHP has the Bajrang Dal as 
its militant youth faction. Finally the political party the BJP is the politi-
cal faction of the wing. Together these bodies comprise a part of what 
is called the Sangh Parivar (parivar means family), the umbrella family 
organisation of all the Hindu nationalist organisations.
The years 1989 and 1990 co-incised with numerous crucial parallel 
events which witnessed the rise of Hindutva. First, the formulation of 
a coalition government in India for a second time in Indian politics. 
(The first was formulated post the elections of 1977 when the Con-
gress lost a majority support due to the prior state of emergency de-
clared by [Congress] Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. This would be the 
first time that no drastic events such as the emergency had occurred 
and yet the Congress would be voted out of power.) The Congress 
failed to secure a clear majority and a new coalition, led by V.P. Singh 
as Prime Minister stayed in power with the support of the Communist 
parties and the BJP. Second, in 1989, the VHP started the collection 
of the bricks and their worship from all over India and abroad and 
staged numerous processions agitating even more rigorously for the 
demolition of the mosque and the construction of the Ram Mandir 
(Van der Veer 1994). Villages in the state of Bihar faced numerous 
riots at the time with those like Bhagalpur being completely wiped off 
of their Muslim population. 
Third, what became very apparent by now, was the collaboration 
between the VHP, the RSS and the BJP (the political party that now 
supported the coalition government from outside). Prominent BJP 
leaders carried VHP and RSS portfolios, among them being L.K. Ad-
vani (one of the main agitators for the mandir construction) and Atal 
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Behari Vajpayee (who would later become the Prime Minister of India 
in 1998 up to 2004 and in under whose central government the sec-
ond described incident above in Gujarat also occurred). Fourth, the 
developments in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, acted as a re-in-
vigorating trigger for the popularity of the Hindu right. Almost 90 per 
cent of the state’s Pandits (Kashmiri Hindus) were ousted from the 
territory during these years. The community faced ethnic cleansing 
post the beginning of the Kashmir insurgency (conflict between the 
Indian army and the militant organisations that have laid claims on a 
sovereign Islamic Kashmir). Estimates of 250,000-350,000 Kashmiri 
Pandits live as internally displaced persons, post the exodus, in other 
parts of India with their current population in the state being reduced 
to around 3000 (IDMC 2008: 3). This occurrence timed well with the 
BJP’s anti-Muslim agenda as the exodus was seen and dramatised as 
an attack on the Hindu majority by militant organisations that had 
roots in Pakistan. In India, this anti-Pakistan stand also meant an 
anti-Muslim stand, with Pakistan being co-related to a Muslim iden-
tity narrative.
In 1990, the BJP/RSS/VHP camp announced a final procession 
called Ram Rath Yatra from the state of Gujarat up to Ayodhya that 
would eventually culminate in the construction of the mandir (tem-
ple) in September, set to reach Ayodhya by the 30th of October. 
Leading the procession was the BJP member L.K. Advani who was 
seen in an open Toyota car that was decorated like Lord Ram’s myth-
ological chariot, somehow impersonating the deity himself. Advani 
was arrested in the state of Bihar before making it to Ayodhya. The 
state governments of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar were dominated by 
leaders of political parties that were supporting the central govern-
ment but not the BJP. Advani’s arrest caused the eventual withdrawal 
of support to the coalition government by the BJP. As the followers 
continued with the march without Advani, they were stopped by an 
open fire from the police. This was once again painted into an agenda 
by the BJP with the protestors who had participated in the march be-
ing epitomised as martyrs. 
What followed is a thorough electoral campaign in the state for 
the upcoming elections in which religious symbolism became a norm. 
The ashes of the dead marchers were taken in special “ritual pots”, 
to borrow Van der Veer’s term (1994: 6), asthi kalash, major ritual 
sacrifices or yajnas were performed in which numerous BJP and VHP 
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leaders participated. Audio and video cassettes of such exercises 
were rotated. As will be highlighted in the section below, whereby a 
discussion of the sensitising lens for the project is undertaken briefly, 
such actualised manifestations of the religious imaginations in the 
form of videos etc. contributed severely to the figuration of certain 
aesthetic formations (Meyer 2002). They not only helped in postulat-
ing the imagination of the Hindu or the Hindu nation, Hindu Rashtra 
as it was called, but also contributed to the spaces for the realisation 
of such imaginaries. Besides, numerous actors who had played the 
role of religious deities in mythological films and TV series also en-
tered the political arena at this time. As aptly stated by Van der Veer 
(1994: 7): “Playing a saint or a god in a movie qualifies a person for 
saintliness or godliness on the political stage. [...] there is clearly a 
penchant among the public for the struggle between good and evil 
[...]. The new discovery is the dramatisation of religious tales.” T.V. 
serials like Ramayana (aired from 1987-1988), that staged the life of 
the deity Ram, popularised Ayodhya as the birth place of the God and 
also became a medium for the material manifestation of a religious 
national imagination.
6. Tremors Post-Ayodhya, 1992
The Bombay violence post the Ayodhya incident shocked the world: 
Post-colonial India had long been held up as a political success sto-
ry. The world’s largest democracy, whose citizens enjoyed freedom of 
speech and religious tolerance, was seen to have escaped the military 
dictatorship and sectarian strife that had been the fate of so many ex-
colonial states. The violence of 1992 appeared to many in the western 
media as the resurgence of internecine rivalries, evidence that Indians 
had failed in the task of overwriting their sectarian affiliations with na-
tional identity. (Tejani 2008: 3)
6.1. Some Critics of Indian Secularism
As a point of departure, it would be useful to mention the work of J. 
Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (1994), which is oft 
viewed as a canonical foundation to the realm of secularisation (secular-
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ism being associated more with the history of its ideas and secularisa-
tion to transformations in society). Casanova sketches three theses to 
the theory of secularisation which enable its understanding as the dif-
ferentiation of the secular spheres from religious norms and institutions, 
the general decline of religious beliefs and practices and finally the mar-
ginalisation of religion to a privatised sphere. The advent of modernity 
led to a decline of religion, a rise of nation states, that which remained 
within the public sphere was privatised and finally an institutional sepa-
ration was instrumentalised (Casanova 1994). Though helpful in an un-
derstanding of the paradigm, this theoretisation does not offer adequate 
means for an understanding of the complex in India neither in the way 
it was intended nor in how it is practiced. As the above sections have 
tried to elucidate, the term religion cannot have a stabilised, contoured 
understanding in India as these definitions are constantly negotiated in 
an environment where ‘religion’ is not simply an established normative 
concept but also a ‘performed’ practice which is dynamic in changing its 
media of communication.
This is also in line with the anthropologist Talal Asad (2003: 181-
201), who critiques the idea of institutional differentiation on grounds 
that religion has an enormous influence still in many countries on the 
sphere of politics as also economy and pedagogy. Religion, thus, an 
external invention for him, is not an isolable category. One of the semi-
nal works on secularism in India, is Donald Smith’s India as a Secular 
State (1963). Smith places his topology within the parameters of three 
sets of relationships among religion, state and the individual. These 
three aren’t mutually exclusive categories. First, the relation between 
the religion and the individual which requires the exclusion of the state. 
Second, that between the state and the individual from which religion 
is excluded. Here the proposition is that the state acknowledges the 
equality of citizens and views them independently of their religious af-
filiations. And finally that between the state and religion, which implies 
a rejection of state religions. Smith opines that the “consolidation of the 
secular state in India was never smooth” (Bhargava 2005: 18). 
In his critique of Indian secularism Smith has suggested that the 
problem with the Indian ‘version’ lies in the fact that the State has as-
sumed a role of the reforming body for the majoritarian Hindu religion, 
intervening in many of the personal laws. However, it has simultane-
ously, in the claim for upholding its image, been relatively non-interven-
tional in those of minorities like Muslims under the garb of protection of 
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minorities. His complaint thus is that protection of minorities as well as 
reforms or intervention in personal laws ought not to acquire ‘neurotic’ 
dimensions whereby minorities are given complete freedom sometimes 
(even though the Fundamental Rights guaranteed in the Constitution 
come in conflict with them) whereas there is an obsession with reform 
in the majority religion. They should rather be undertaken within the 
framework of the idea of ‘equal citizenship.’ This viewpoint is critiqued 
by Marc Galanter who states that Smith’s work shifts ‘unwittingly’ from 
a descriptive to a normative view of religion. His argument is grounded 
in the assumption that a secular state has to acquire a normative con-
ception of religion and ought to, in that context, judge, reform and 
evaluate religion. That being the premises, it is impossible to foresee 
that the state will not interfere and that it can observe strict neutrality 
(Galanter 1965: 133-159).
Rajeev Bhargava (2005), who is also known for his seminal work on 
Secularism in India, is in line with Galanter’s critique here and in fact 
builds further on the arguments. Bhargava (2006: 20-53) explains that 
unlike its external counterparts, secularism, in its distinct variant in In-
dia, does not find its basis on the strict separation between religion and 
the state. The boundary created is not absolute in its nature and does 
not imply a complete dichotomy of the two spheres. His variant views 
Indian secularism as one that maintains a ‘principled distance’ between 
religion and the state. Indian secularism, “[...] by balancing the claims 
of individuals and religious communities, never intended a bludgeoning 
privatisation of religion. It also embodies a model of contextual moral 
reasoning. All these features combine to form contextual secularism.” 
(Bhargava 2006: 28) Inherent then, are the departures that the ideal 
makes from mainstream western secularism as it is called.
Whereas, articles in the Constitution do exist that follow this main-
stream idea such as the principle of non-establishment: “No religious 
instruction to be provided in any educational institutions wholly main-
tained out of state funds” (Article 28 (1)), guarantee of religious lib-
erty (Articles 25, 27 and 28 ‒ each individual is entitled to freedom 
of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate 
religion; freedom of conscience here referring to people without re-
ligious affiliations), no obligation to pay any taxes for the promotion 
or maintenance of any religion, non-requirement to participate in re-
ligious instructions in any educational institution (Article 28(3)), non-
discrimination of citizens by the state on grounds of their religion or 
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caste or language etc. However, simultaneously there exist articles 
such as those recognising the rights of religious minorities (Article 
30(1)) specifically and thus, unlike all the articles that are applicable 
to all citizens as individuals, such articles are eventually in recogni-
tion of community based rights. Also the state provides aid to educa-
tional institutions that are run by certain religious communities (Article 
30(2)) and religious instruction is permitted in institutions that are 
only partly funded by the state. Articles 25(2) and 17 in fact incor-
porate an intervention of the state in religious affairs. Article (25(2)) 
provides for the state to be able to make laws providing for social 
welfare and reform or the throwing open of the Hindu religious institu-
tions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. And 
Article 17 is a direct attack on the caste system in Hinduism asking for 
its abolishment. 
Even though this does render the picture fuzzier, what ought to be 
remembered is that there are personal laws or religious codes (espe-
cially instrumental in the case of marriage and inheritance of property) 
that govern the lives of people depending on their religion by birth. 
Many religious practices have been unjust and brutal and imply a dep-
rivation of fundamental freedoms to the citizens. The state is inevita-
bly pushed to intervene in such affairs thereby technically departing 
from the ‘strict wall of separation’ between religion and state princi-
ples. More so, in the case of the majority religion Hinduism where any 
central governing body like a Church is absent poses complications 
on the question of self-reform through a central body thus requiring 
the state to intervene. Thus, the notion of principled distance implies 
an institutional separation of the state from any religious body while 
simultaneously requiring the state to engage with religion at the level 
of law and policy (Bhargava 2006: 20-53). 
As Bhargava (2006: 29) states: “Unlike western secularism that ap-
pears to impose a choice between active hostility and benign indiffer-
ence, Indian secularism brings to bear on religion an attitude of critical 
respect.” These lines do sound loaded as does Bhargava’s claim that in 
fact the Indian example can be posited as a Trans-cultural Ideal rather 
than being abashed for its failure to deliver in India. What is extremely 
convincing in Bhargava’s approach is that here one encounters an at-
tempt to indicate that there can be no ‘guiding master approach’ or set, 
defined frameworks which have been seen to function in the West and 
produced a working template. Secularism in the West too, though oft 
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homogenised, stands contested, lacking in definite coordinates and a 
clear grasp of what it entails. “Each country in the West has worked out 
a particular political compromise rather than implementing a solution 
uniquely required by the configuration of values embodied in secular-
ism” (Bhargava  2005: 3). It is thus, no wonder that secularism with the 
separation thesis implies different notions in the United States, France, 
Germany and Britain.
However, the above adulations of the concept, which do acknowl-
edge the hidden shortcomings but nonetheless view it as an inspirable 
ideal, are not the only ones playing each other out in the dynamic field 
of the intellectual world, liberal circles or English language media in 
India. Some of the harshest criticisms of the paradigm from the intel-
lectual field in India emanated in the voices of T.N. Madan (2005) and 
Ashish Nandy (2005). Nandy (2005: 321) states that secularism “as a 
generally shared credo of life is impossible, as a basis for state action 
impracticable, and as a blueprint for the foreseeable future impotent.” 
Both the critical remarks on Indian secularism contest that Secularism 
as an ideology has no indigenous roots in India. They view it as a super-
imposed project, just as modernity itself. India and Indians can never 
delineate the spheres from each other and thus attempts at doing so 
would only result in ‘erosion’ what they term as Indian cultures. 
Models of modernisation prescribe the transfer of secularism to 
non-western societies without regard for the character of their re-
ligious traditions or for the gifts these might have to offer […]. In 
traditional societies they can only mean conversion and the loss 
of one’s culture and the loss of one’s soul. (Madan 2005: 308)
What is implied is a difference between religion-as-faith and religion-
as-ideology. The former has its foundations in the ways of life that 
people have come to establish, religion being its essential guiding dic-
tum. It is in this light, that one is pushed in the direction of asking 
questions regarding the understanding of religion and what it entails 
where. Interestingly, enough, the Hindi term for religion is dharma 
which when literally understood, implies duty. Secularism in the both 
the abovementioned viewpoints is seen as an externally imposed ma-
chinery that pays lip-service to external constructs but at its heart is 
found to be baseless. As a response to the crisis, then they suggest, 
that both Hinduism and Islam in India, in fact all religions in India, 
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entail values of tolerance that ought to be retrieved for any work-
able solution to confront communal horrors. However, Sumit Sarkar 
(1994:102) has argued that in their quest for solutions, a lot is derived 
from what may in a general context be categorised as Hindu civilisa-
tion and thus the criticism that this perspective shares a discursive 
space with the Hindu Right.
7. Situating the Actors: The Hindu Right’s Semantic Reversals 
and the Secularism Paradigm
As mentioned above, many controversies have arisen post the second 
half of the eighties as to what the terms secularism and secularisation 
have implied in India. There has been a growing discrepancy vis-à-vis 
the interventionist role of the state. The Hindu Right which is one of the 
key elements of this debate has alleged parties like the Congress, which 
have primarily dominated the political scene in India, of taking com-
plete responsibility for the reformation of Hinduism per se while simul-
taneously pandering minority religions like Islam by non-intervention in 
those domains that require reform. There is thus an allegation which is 
dramatically staged in all discourses belonging to the rhetoric of the BJP/
VHP/RSS combine that the apparently secular Congress has provided 
reservations for Muslims in civil and educational institutions and been 
lenient to discriminatory Muslim personal laws, thereby elucidating its 
prejudices. A state which is ‘genuinely’ secular ought to view all citizens 
through a similar lens and thus a Uniform Civil Code is desirable. It is on 
the same stand that the Congress is labelled as being ‘pseudo-secular’. 
However, on a more realistic level, when encountered with the anti-
Muslim agenda that these parties propagate and the emanating wave 
of communal violence that has haunted India for the last 63 years or 
more, one comes to question the darker contexts of such ‘universalising’ 
claims. Secularism, then appears to have become an ideological tool, a 
“stick with which to beat the Muslim minority” (Chatterjee 2011: 5). 
Partha Chatterjee (2005: 345) aptly points out from the ideological 
moorings of the Hindu right in India that it has brilliantly adapted itself 
to the semantics of secularism, meticulously describing the Congress 
agenda as pseudo-secular. In doing so, it has in fact accepted the ap-
peal of the framework as such. And here in perhaps lies the power of the 
discourse. In a politics guided by numbers, the initial thrust of ‘making’ 
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or ‘constructing’ a controversy in Ayodhya, did give its due results as 
could be seen in the following years. However, over the past few dec-
ades as the conflict and its repercussions have flared up enormously, 
there has been a slight ‘cooling off’ by the BJP. This is not to state that 
the VHP or the RSS have declined in staging the dramatics of Hindutva. 
What is remarkable indeed is that there are no longer any attempts in 
favour of Hindu theocratic institutions, scriptural injunctions, participa-
tion of religious institutions in legislative procedures or, for that matter, 
even the introduction of curtailments of scientific or literary endeavours, 
as could be viewed a few decades ago in the agenda of the Hindu Ma-
hasabha with its emphasis on the founding of the Hindu Rashtra (Hindu 
Nation). There is an intelligent shift thus, whereby now the movement 
does not pit against the ideal of secularism as such. As Chatterjee aptly 
sums up:
This is indeed a Hindu Right that locates itself quite firmly within the 
domain of the modernising state, and using all of the ideological re-
sources of that state to lead the charge against people who do not con-
form to its version of the ‘national culture’. From this position, the Hindu 
Right can not only deflect accusations of being anti-secular, but can 
even use the arguments for interventionist secularisation to promote 
intolerance and violence against minorities. (Chatterjee 2005: 345) 
Does that imply that in fact, the agenda itself has undergone a sec-
ularisation process? Quite the contrary ‒ if one scrapes beneath the 
surface, one is confronted with regular announced bans on films like 
Deepa Mehta’s Fire and Earth, the former dealing with the story of a 
Hindu lesbian couple in colonial India while the latter being a strong 
criticism of the Hindu widows and the abominable treatment meted 
out towards them in an essentially patriarchal, chauvinistic and sup-
pressing environment whereby ‘religion’ has been utilised as a tool to 
keep power relations floating. The two films created immense con-
troversy in India (the director is a Canadian Indian) with theatres 
beings burnt and attacked when they aired the films and multiple life 
threatening situations for the caste and crew of the films. Occasions 
like Valentine’s Day are publicly condemned even in metropoles like 
Mumbai by the Shiv Sena and there have been numerous reports of 
attacks on young couples seen together on such days. The offered 
justification comes from a defence of what has been homogenised as 
‘Indian values and culture’. Thousands of Muslims have been forced 
to be internally displaced in the advent of the communal violence 
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of 1992 and again in 2002 and innumerable mosques have been 
destroyed all over India. The Christian minority has also not been 
forgiven with incidents like the burning of the priest Graham Staines 
(Chatterjee 2011) and his sons and the recurrent forced conversions 
still being a reality. 
This is to point out that the guiding dictum of the Indian National 
Congress pre and post the colonial era, Gandhi’s Ramrajya and im-
aginations of a secular and tolerant India, and Nehru’s liberal secular 
consensus of a syncretic India, have all become a resource for the 
Hindu brigade and in a formidable ‘semantic reversal’ are used as a 
framework for attacking the same by one of India’s most fundamen-
talist forces. Indeed the movement has been intelligent enough to 
learn the language of the medium and utilise it for attacking its ideo-
logical opponents. It is in this convoluted context that the term ‘com-
munal’ has come to be associated with the Muslim in India whereas 
the term ‘pseudo-secular’ has been stored for the ‘Hindu who de-
fends the rights of the Muslim’. Partha Chatterjee (2005: 347) thus 
provokes a formidable question in asking: “Is the defence of secular-
ism an appropriate ground for meeting the challenge of the Hindu 
Right? Or should it be fought where the attack is being made, that 
is – should the response be a defence of the duty of the democratic 
state to ensure policies of religious toleration?”
8. Opening the Pandora’s Box ‒ Who Cares for Secularism in 
India?
The above presented story thus immediately thrusts one to ask the 
obvious question ‒ so who really cares for secularism in India? Why 
does it matter that India be a secular democracy? Has secularism been 
relegated to being a mere word, emptied of all meaning, which is used 
by the political leadership of the country ‒ the Congress for making 
appeals to a more diverse vote bank and the BJP for strengthening its 
Hindu support while simultaneously defeating the Congress at its own 
linguistic game? Here too innumerable complications abound the field. 
It is here that the minoritarian perspective acquires agency. Nandini 
Chatterjee (2011: 5) in a historical study of the Christian minority in 
India recounts her encounter with the power of the discourse, as could 
be felt, in experiences with members of the Christian community. 
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During the traumatic episodes (the murder of Graham Staines) and 
all through the period of my extended research work in India, I was 
deeply impressed by the deep commitment of Christian leaders across 
the board to a political concept they called ‘secularism,’ which they 
often explicitly related to the specific Indian constitutional provisions 
establishing freedom of religion. Secularism therefore has a positive 
connotation not only for the majoritarian Hindus, [...] but it is also a 
constitutional, political and social ideal for minority groups, especially 
Christians, including people who are active members and office-holders 
of the churches they belong to. 
Secularism thus also becomes an agenda that needs to be ‘rescued’ 
so that the minorities in India can co-habit that ‘national space’ that 
seems to be the pivotal peak to be achieved for both the BJP (as when 
under the coalition government) and the Congress. Thus, what is at-
tempted here is to highlight that this is not just an ideal that could 
be relegated to the political ideologies of two political parties in India, 
but also a visceral desirable paradigm for India’s multifarious minori-
ties. Gayatri Spivak (2004), in tracing the trajectory of the Subaltern 
in her work, states, in this context, that Secularism thus looms in the 
Indian realities as “an impoverished abstraction that needs to be pre-
served”. It is in fact a paradigm in contemporary India that constitutes 
the metonymisation (rather synecdoche) for the Indian subject. This 
implies an arrangement so that the part (the Indian citizen) may be 
able to be representative of, and relate to, the whole or sum (the state) 
in order to be able to claim, in order to be able to hold the state ac-
countable for itself. Thus this is not just a floating ideology but one 
that silently creeps through the ‘common’ citizen and the everyday, 
imploring one to ponder upon whether there is more to the narrative 
than ‘spoken’ discourses, whereby a quiet understanding exists to its 
nature and promises. 
It also acquires an actualised or visceral dimension for the peo-
ple in India, when one delves into the stories and incidents that an 
everyday encounter confronts the individual. In a documentary based 
on a 15th century Sufi mystic, Kabir (his work is oft quoted by the 
Prime Ministers in their speeches), whose philosophy set to establish 
a sect that would overcome the orthodoxy of Islam and Hinduism, 
Shabnum Virmani (2003), engages in the question of how a thinker 
with a Muslim upbringing could seek Ram. What is interesting here, 
is that in her encounters in Ayodhya, one is revealed to the fact that 
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videos, cassettes and postcards of the demolition of the Babri Masjid 
are sold on every street of the city. There is a severe daily demand for 
the same by many who visit the shrines in the city (Virmani 2003). 
There is thus a new media that lends materialisation to the figuration 
of such aesthetic formations. To provide another example ‒ The RSS 
runs approximately 20,000 secondary and primary schools in India 
today, known by the name of Vidya Bharati (vidya meaning educa-
tion and bharati coming from India’s other known name, after its first 
king, Bharat). The text books and curriculum in such schools is loaded 
with jargon and abominations against the Muslim community. One of 
the questions asked in an exam organised by the school (mathemat-
ics) went as follows: “If it takes four sevaks to demolish one mosque 
how many does it take to demolish twenty? (Delhi Historians Group: 
2001).”12 Meanwhile academicians like Romila Thapar who have been 
engaging in the content of textbooks and have made provocative re-
marks upon (with evidences) Vedic Aryans eating beef, have faced 
tumultuous consequences for their boldness (Morey and Tickell 2005: 
xxiii). The idea thus has remained static ‒ there is a necessity to fixate 
the national self and that national self is viewed in many discourses as 
the Hindu self. Thus, any propositions that challenge established pat-
terns and norms that are used as a defining moment for that ‘Hindu 
identity’ are stubbed before they raise doubtful analogies.
9. Conclusions
The above examples are but a few examples to illustrate that the de-
bate in India has not been relegated just and only to political camps, it 
also has a ‘real’ dimension in that voting behaviours are guided by it, 
in that a school pupil in India is made ‘aware of’ the term through text 
books, and in that it is indeed contested increasingly by an ever ex-
panding, enormous ‘middle class’ leaving the realms of the intellectual 
and academic world. There is a constitutional vocabulary and career 
that the term has experienced in an independent India. However, post 
the tremors of the Ayodhya conflict and the Gujarat riots, the theme of 
secularism has entered more intuitive discussions. In summation, a few 
remarks that stand out from the trajectory of the term in a post-colonial 
India include the following: That secularism in India is not viewed pri-
marily in a strict sense of ‘the wall of separation’ between the state and 
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religion. It does not imply irreligiousness but nonetheless, seeks a dis-
tinction of the political sphere from induction of religious themes. The 
state in fact intervenes in religious issues which normally lie under the 
purview of ‘personal laws’, at least for the Hindu majority, as a reform-
ing body. Controversies have arisen in the past and continue to arise 
on the question of intervention. The Hindu Right employs the paradigm 
to illustrate the prejudices held by the state (usually with Congress 
governments in power) in terms of relative non-intervention in Muslim 
personal laws. Post the Ayodhya conflict the debate stands as not just 
being relegated to the academic and liberal intellectual world but has 
come to be debated outside these realms. In most discourses, it has 
historically been viewed vis-à-vis its prominent other ‘Communalism’. 
The term itself has a relatively recent career in India and is replaced in 
contemporary rhetoric with new phraseology in Indian languages (par-
ticularly Hindi), where numerous resources for the same are paradoxi-
cally borrowed from religious texts and scriptures. 
Endnotes
1 Slogan chanted by the karsevaks, Hindu volunteers who marched 
to the city of Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, in order to demolish the 
Babri Masjid (mosque).
2 This is also one of the controversies surrounding the event – as 
to whether the bricks called the ramshilas (or Ram’s bricks) that 
were collected for the shilanyanas (translated as foundation cer-
emony) were actually collected from different parts of the world 
as a contribution from the prominent Hindu Diaspora or whether 
this is part of the narrative construed by the Bharatiya Janata 
Party as a prominent instrumentaliser of the event and collabora-
tor of the Hindu Right Wing.
3  People’s Party of India.
4 World Hindu Council.
5 Many, it was later investigated, were not VHP members or kar-
sevaks, who were visiting Ayodhya as agitators for the construc-
tion of the Ram temple at the Ramjanmabhoomi in Ayodhya, 
but rather pilgrims who had been lured to join the VHP with the 
promise of getting to perform rituals in Ayodhya and meager 
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sums of 100 Rupees.
6 This is an approximate figure because the statistics of the num-
ber of deaths and missing individuals vary enormously in sourc-
es. Official statistics of the Government were maintained at 900 
because many of the victims were registered as missing rather 
than dead.
7 The intention here is not to engage in details in the history of the 
two conflicts. Thus, an emphasis is not placed here in locating 
the various actors – the Hindu Right Wing and its contributing 
elements like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), the Rashtriya 
Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS), and the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP), the Central Government’s role, the State Government’s 
alleged involvement in the riots. The author intends to introduce 
these two moments only briefly to provide the context to the 
readers against which the paper is set.
8 Here I imply the imaginations of a sovereign India that were pro-
jected in the last phase of the movement starting 1940 by the 
Congress leadership.
9 This sensitising framework is borrowed from Meyer et. al (2002) 
to grasp an understanding of the formulation or actualisation of 
the ‘Idea of India’ through the medium of speeches by its po-
litical elite. The proposition is to employ Anderson’s Imagined 
Communities as a point of departure but then to develop upon 
it to unleash the ‘sensational forms’ that render such ‘imagined’ 
entities like nations real and touchable for both those within and 
without. Formation is used instead of communities to highlight 
the dynamism of the nation abstaining from viewing it as a stag-
nant bordered group with non-negotiable defined contours.
10 Gandhi describes Ramrajya in Young India, the journal he initi-
ated in 1919, as follows: “By Ramrajya I do not mean Hindu 
Raj. I mean Ramrajya Divine Raj, the Kingdom of God. For me 
Rama and Rahim are one and the same deity. I acknowledge no 
other God but the one God of truth and righteousness. Whether 
Rama of my imagination ever lived or not on this earth, the an-
cient ideal of Ramrajya is undoubtedly one of true democracy in 
which the meanest citizen could be sure of swift justice without 
an elaborate and costly procedure. Even the dog is described by 
the poet to have received justice under Ramrajya.” (Young India, 
19.09.1929, p. 305). 
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11 National Patriotic or Volunteer organisation
12 Sevak here is a reference to the members of the Sangh Parivar, 
who contributed to the demolition of the mosque in 1992 (Delhi 
Historians Group 2001: 7).
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